Avocent SwitchView(R)SC440 Manuel d'utilisateur

National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report Argon Corp Ruggedized KVM

4. ASSUMPTIONS 4.1 Physical Security Assumptions A key environmental assumption is physical security, for it is assumed appropriate phys

GROUP with an ID other than the selected one T.TRANSFER A CONNECTION, via the TOE, between COMPUTERS may allow information transfer. 4.5 Organization

5. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION 5.1 Logical Scope and Boundary The TOE logical scope and boundary consists of the security functions/features

Figure 1: Depiction of TOE Deployment A B C D

6. DOCUMENTATION This section details the documentation that is (a) delivered to the customer, and (b) was used as evidence for the evaluation of the

7. IT PRODUCT TESTING This section describes the testing efforts of the Developer and the evaluation team. 7.1 Developer Testing Test procedures

Note: 1. Four-button remote set-up is illustrated. Omit computers C and D with two-button remote. 2. Laptop screens serve as

7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing The evaluation team conducted independent testing both at the CCTL and the Developer’s facilities.

possible without disassembly of the TOE, thus penetration is not possible via the product control, i.e., user/administrator interfaces. Additional

8. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION The evaluated configuration of the Argon Corp Ruggedized KVM Switch Part Number 90731, as defined in the Security Target,

9. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) processes

10. VALIDATOR COMMENTS It should be noted that Precedent Decision -138 affects the Protection Profile that this TOE conforms with. The customer

11. ANNEXES None

12. SECURITY TARGET Argon Corp Ruggedized KVM Switch Security Target, Document Version .11, May 3, 2011

13. GLOSSARY  Administrator: Role applied to user with full access to all aspects of the Cybex SwitchView SC Series Switches.  Attack: An atta

14. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1.) Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated Septemb

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Validation Team Mario Tinto The Aerospace Corporation Columbia, MD Rick Murphy Noblis Falls Church, VA Common Criteria Testing

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report is intended to assist the end-user of this product and any security certification Agent for the end-user with determ

The TOE is a peripheral sharing switch. The physical boundary of the TOE consists of one Argon switch and one of three remote controls (see Table 1:

2. IDENTIFICATION The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to

Table 2: Evaluation Identifiers Item Identifier Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Target of Evalu

3. SECURITY POLICY The TOE enforces the following security policies: 3.1 Data Separation Policy The TOE implements the Data Separation Security Fu

switches that allow the human user to explicitly determine to which computer the shared set of peripherals is connected. This connection is visually d